We should not be surprised about Volkswagen’s “Diesel-Gate”

By Bill Brandon, Special to The Digest

Fooling with computers to give false readings has happened before. It is important to recognize similarities to earlier cases and EPA’s role in them.

The 1998 consent decree

In October 1998, the DOJ and EPA entered into a consent decree with heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers for installing ‘defeat’ device programs just as Volkswagon has done. These Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) included Caterpillar, Cummins, Detroit Diesel, Mack, Navistar, Renault and Volvo. The agreed settlement of $83.4 million between the seven OEMs and EPA was the largest to be issued at that time. The EPA emissions rules had been objected to by the OEMs but their concerns were ignored by EPA.

The issue was similar to arguments about the original Clean Air Act of 1975. Meeting the CAA standards required changing fuel composition and eliminating lead from gasoline. This was accomplished over the objections of the oil companies and OEMs. Auto manufacturers were required to install catalytic converters that could only use unleaded gas, as the lead would destroy the exhaust treatment equipment. After 1975, filling stations were required to carry both leaded and unleaded grades of gasoline.

Introduction of ULSD

The diesel OEMs had a similar problem, as the high sulfur content of diesel fuel would adversely affect their exhaust treatment ability. The EPA however ignored these complaints in favor of oil company objections about the cost of removing sulfur from diesel. This practically assured non-compliance solutions from the OEMs. The diesel OEMs held to their objections and by January of 2001 the low sulfur diesel standards were finalized giving oil companies seven years to comply.

With the introduction of ultra low sulfur diesel in the U. S. and Europe, Volkswagen began their ‘Clean Diesel’ approach to light vehicles. They met technical, customer and regulatory issues with this strategy. By 2009, the competing issues of emissions, performance and mileage became evident. President Obama had taken office and proposed to raise Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards. This was a continuing problem for Volkswagen.

CAFE regulation: “trying to address obesity by requiring tailors to only make small clothes”

Administration of the CAFÉ regulations included the EPA, NHTSA and DOE. Legitimate concerns about the nature of calculating CAFÉ standards were raised and discussed. The whole concept of the CAFÉ standards was characterized by one auto executive as “trying to address obesity by requiring tailors to only make small clothes.” In July, 2011 new CAFÉ standards and methods of calculation were agreed to by 13 OEMs that included Ford, GM, Chrysler, BMW, Honda, Hyundai, Jaguar/Land Rover, Kia, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Toyota and Volvo.

Volkswagen responded to this agreement with the following statement: “Volkswagen does not endorse the proposal under discussion. It places an unfairly high burden on passenger cars, while allowing special compliance flexibility for heavier light trucks. Passenger cars would be required to achieve 5% annual improvements, and light trucks 3.5% annual improvements. The largest trucks carry almost no burden for the 2017-2020 timeframe, and are granted numerous ways to mathematically meet targets in the outlying years without significant real-world gains.

The proposal encourages manufacturers and customers to shift toward larger, less efficient vehicles, defeating the goal of reduced greenhouse gas emissions.” Volkswagen has also cited that the new plan is unfair to makers of clean diesel engines. As a result, Volkswagen is one of the only major auto manufacturers to not sign the agreement.

Excessive burden on the tailor, causing the gaming?

Whether these CAFÉ rules are discriminatory against ‘Clean Diesel’ as VW claims or just discriminatory against manufacturers that don’t make trucks to offset the ‘average economy’ of the fleet can be disputed, but the fact remains that responsibility for emissions and efficiency is again being placed on the ‘tailor’ rather that the providers of ‘junk food’ (AKA oil companies). EPA’s favorable treatment of ‘legacy fuels’ rather that pressing for new ‘modern’ fuels as was done in 1975 is stretching the reasonable limits of vehicle engineering technology. Besides adding cost to new vehicles, these ‘advanced technologies’ cannot address a major health concern that EPA is ignoring. That is the production of ultra fine particles from aromatics that can enter our blood stream and lodge in our bodies creating many health issues.

Primary among these ‘modern fuels’ are dimethyl ether (DME), a diesel substitute, and E30 – E40 gasoline blends. Even if these low carbon molecules are made from fossil sources, they can promote an improvement in CO2 emissions, increase fuel economy, and lower health related emissions, particularly ultra fine particles. Until EPA shifts some of the responsibility for lower emissions and increased fuel economy onto the fuel we use, these ‘scandals’ will persist. Maybe the real scandal here is EPA’s approach to regulation giving oil companies a relatively free ride.